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THE GAP CREATED BY E-COMMERCE: HOW STATES CAN PRESERVE THEIR 
SALES AND USE TAX REVENUE IN THE DIGITAL AGE 
 
© 2012 Jessica Nicole Cory 
I. Introduction 
Since its inception in 1932, the state sales tax has become an increasingly important 
source of revenue for most states, including Oklahoma.
1
  Today, forty-five states and the District 
of Columbia impose a general sales tax.
2
   Nationally, these taxes resulted in $224.5 billion of 
revenue in 2010, which, at 31.9% of total state tax collections, represents the second greatest 
source of state revenue.
3
  Oklahoma collected $5,164,499,000 in revenue in 2010.
4
  Of that total, 
approximately 38%, or $1,968,309,000, came from general sales taxes.
5
  States that do not 
impose a state income tax—such as Florida, Nevada, Texas, and Washington—rely even more 
heavily on sales tax dollars, with sales taxes generating a majority of their tax revenues.
6
  
Retail sales taxes, or simply “sales taxes,” are a levy on the sale of tangible, personal 
property, imposed on a transaction-by-transaction basis, measured by the “sales price” or “gross 
                                                        
1
 The Growth of State and Local Sales Taxation, in WALTER HELLERSTEIN, HELLERSTEIN & 
HELLERSTEIN: STATE TAXATION ¶ 12.02 (3d. ed. 2011), available at 1999 WL 1398963, at *1  
[hereinafter Growth of Sales Taxation]. 
2
 Only Alaska, Delaware, Montana, New Hampshire, and Oregon have no general sales tax. 
MELISSA BRAYBROOKS ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATE GOVERNMENT TAX COLLECTIONS 
SUMMARY REPORT: 2010, at 3 (Mar. 2011), available at 
http://www2.census.gov/govs/statetax/2010stcreport.pdf [hereinafter 2010 SUMMARY REPORT].   
3
 General sales taxes were second only to revenue from individual income taxes, which 
accounted for 33.5% of total tax revenue.  Id. at 3 fig. 1. 
4
 Id. at app. tbl. A-1.  
5
 Id.  
6
 Growth of Sales Taxation, supra note 1, ¶ 12.02, available at 1999 WL 1398963, at *1. 
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proceeds” of the sale.7  Generally, although the consumer bears the economic incidence of the 
tax, the vendor, or seller, collects and remits the appropriate amount of sales tax to the state.
8
  
Because states only have jurisdiction to impose sales taxes on transactions occurring within their 
borders, states impose a complementary tax known as the “use tax” to prevent tax evasion.9  The 
use tax is a levy upon “the use, storage, or other consumption in the state of tangible personal 
property that has not been subjected to a sales tax,” generally measured by the “cost price,” 
“purchase price,” or “fair market value” of the property brought into the state.10  The sales tax 
and use tax work together to ensure that all purchases of tangible personal property, whether 
transacted within or outside of the state, are subject to a uniform tax burden.
11
  This diminishes 
the possibility of tax avoidance through out-of-state purchases and protects local businesses from 
out-of-state competitors that can offer lower prices because of lower or nonexistent sales tax 
burdens.
12
   
Although the use tax imposes a tax on purchases of the same items at the same rate as the 
state sales tax, use taxes differ in an important way—unlike sales taxes, where the vendor 
collects and remits the tax due, individual purchasers are often responsible for reporting and 
remitting any use tax due to their state taxing authority.
13
  This individual burden stems from the 
Supreme Court‟s decision in Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, in which the Court held that states are 
constitutionally prevented from requiring out-of-state sellers to collect and remit sales tax when 
                                                        
7
 Introduction to the American Retail Sales Tax, in HELLERSTEIN, supra  note 1, ¶ 12.01, 
available at 1999 WL 1398962, at *2 [hereinafter American Retail Sales Tax]; Introduction to 
Chapter 16 – Use Taxes, in HELLERSTEIN, supra  note 1, ¶ 16.01,  available at 1999 WL 
1399001, at *4 [hereinafter Introduction]. 
8
 American Retail Sales Tax, supra note 7, ¶ 12.01, available at 1999 WL 1398962, at *2. 
9
 Introduction, supra note 7, ¶ 16.01, available at 1999 WL 1399001, at *2. 
10
 Id. 
11
 67B AM. JUR. 2D Sales and Use Taxes § 1.  
12
 Id. § 134.  
13
 Zelda Ferguson, Is the Tax Holiday Over for Online Sales?, 63 TAX LAW. 1279, 1281 (2010). 
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those vendors do not have a substantial nexus with—or physicial presence within—the taxing 
state.
14
  Use tax reliance on individual self-reporting can lead to major revenue losses for states.  
Not only are many individuals unaware that they are required to remit use tax, others knowingly 
fail to remit use taxes because it is almost impossible for states to enforce use tax payment.
15
   
Given the high dependence of state budgets on sales and use tax revenues, use tax 
evasion represents a serious problem, which is only heightened by the incredible growth of e-
commerce.  Internet purchases are often examples of remote commerce, or transactions that 
involve an in-state buyer and an out-of-state seller, making such purchases subject to use tax, 
rather than sales tax.  Many Internet retailers maintain a nationwide virtual presence but have a 
physical presence in only one or two states.  Because these sellers frequently do not have the 
required nexus with the state where the purchaser resides, they do not have to collect and remit 
the use tax imposed by that state on the transaction.  Given the low use tax compliance rates by 
individual purchasers, the more transactions that take place over the Internet in interstate 
commerce, the less revenue states collect.   
E-commerce represented 7% of total retail and food sales in 2010 and is predicted to 
reach $248.7 billion in revenue by 2014.
16
  Some have forecasted an e-commerce sales growth 
rate of 9% each year through 2012 despite the recession.
17
  The National Conference of State 
Legislatures predicts that states will lose an estimated $23.3 billion in 2012 because they are 
                                                        
14
 Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992). 
15
 Ferguson, supra note 13, at 1281.  
16
Online Retail Sales, NAT‟L RETAIL FED‟N, tbls. 1 & 2, 
http://www.nrf.com/modules.php?name=Pages&sp_id=1240 (last visited Nov. 6, 2011). 
17
 Donald Bruce, William Fox & LeAnn Luna, State and Local Sales Tax Revenue Losses from 
E-Commerce, 52 STATE TAX NOTES 537, 537 (2009).  
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prohibited from requiring online or catalog vendors to collect and remit sales and use taxes.
18
  
Others have estimated that there will be annual state and local tax losses from e-commerce of 
$11.4-12.65 billion by 2012 for a six-year total loss of $52-56.3 billion.
19
  This number increases 
by $6.8 billion if losses from sales by other remote vendors, such as mail-order sales, are 
included.
20
  These revenue losses are particularly troubling because of the major fiscal challenges 
states continue to face, despite the beginning of a slow economic recovery this year.
21
  Given the 
grim fiscal circumstances of the states, the poisonous nature of tax rate increases in the current 
political climate, and the major loss of revenue from the failure of individuals to remit use tax, it 
is not surprising that states are seeking to circumvent, overturn, or re-interpret the Quill decision 
in order to require remote vendors to collect and remit use tax. 
Part II of this paper examines the current constitutional restrictions on state taxing 
authority as set out in the Supreme Court‟s 1992 Quill decision.  The next section, Part III, 
introduces the Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement (the “SSUTA”) and the federal bills 
that seek to implement a national solution to the problem created by Quill.  Part IV discusses the 
different approaches that individual states have taken in attempting to circumvent the restrictions 
set out in Quill in the absence of a federal solution.  Part V analyzes a new approach, not yet 
taken by any state, one that advocates interpreting Quill‟s constitutional restrictions to be 
inapplicable if states compensate remote vendors for the cost of collecting and remitting use 
                                                        
18
 Collecting E-Commerce Taxes: An Interactive Map, NAT‟L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES, 
http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=20274 (last visited Nov. 6, 2011).  
19
 Bruce, Fox & Luna, supra note 17, at 537.  
20
 Id.  
21
 Elizabeth McNichol, Phil Oliff & Nicholas Johnson, States Continue to Feel Recession‟s 
Impact, CENTER ON BUDGET AND POL‟Y PRIORITIES (June 17, 2011), 
http://www.cbpp.org/cms/index.cfm?fa=view&id=711.  
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taxes.  Part VI concludes this note with a brief summary and analysis of the different approaches 
states can take in response to Quill.  
II.  Current Law - Quill Corp. v. North Dakota 
A. Setting the Stage for Quill 
When the Court decided Quill Corp. v. North Dakota in 1992, it specifically noted that it 
was not resolving the case on a blank slate, and that “contemporary Commerce Clause 
jurisprudence might not dictate the same result were the issue to arise for the first time today.”22 
Because the Court‟s Quill opinion emphasized “adherence to settled precedent” and focused on 
harmonizing the holdings of National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue of Illinois and 
Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady,
 23
 knowledge of the facts and holdings of those cases is 
essential to understanding the Court‟s subsequent decision in Quill.    
1. National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue of Illinois 
National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue of Illinois, arose when the State of 
Illinois obtained a judgment from the Illinois Supreme Court that required National Bellas Hess 
(“National”), a mail order house incorporated in Delaware with its principal place of business in 
Missouri, to collect and remit use taxes imposed by Illinois.
24
  National had no physical 
operations or property in Illinois, no employees or sales representatives in Illinois, and did not 
advertize by newspaper, billboards, radio, or television in Illinois.
25
  The only contacts that 
National had with Illinois were through United States mail or common carrier, as twice a year it 
mailed catalogues to all of its active and recent customers—including customers in Illinois—in 
                                                        
22
 Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 311 (1992).  
23
 Id. at 309-18.  
24
 Nat‟l Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep‟t of Revenue of Ill., 386 U.S. 753, 753-54 (1967).  
25
 Id. at 754.  
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addition to mailing out occasional advertising flyers.
26
  Customers would then mail orders for 
merchandise back to National‟s Missouri plant, with the ordered goods sent back to the 
customers by mail or common carrier.
27
  
Illinois law required all retailers “maintaining a place of business” in Illinois to collect 
and remit use tax.
28
  The state‟s tax code defined a “retailer maintaining a place of business” in 
Illinois as one “[e]ngaging in soliciting orders within this state from users by means of 
catalogues or other advertising, whether such orders are received and accepted within or without 
this State.”29  Under this definition, the Illinois Supreme Court found National‟s mail order 
operations sufficient to classify National as a “retailer maintaining a place of business” in 
Illinois, and therefore required National to collect and remit Illinois use tax.
30
  National 
challenged the Illinois statute as a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause 
and the Dormant Commerce Clause.
31
  The United States Supreme Court agreed with National 
on both grounds and reversed the Illinois Supreme Court, finding the Illinois law 
unconstitutional.
32
 
The Court began by affirming the close relationship of Due Process claims and claims of 
an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce.
33
  The Court noted that for states to 
constitutionally “impose the burdens of collecting use taxes upon interstate sales,” there must be 
“some definite link, some minimum connection, between a state and the person, property, or 
                                                        
26
 Id.  
27
 Id. at 754-55.  
28
 Id. at 755.  
29
 Id. 
30
 Id. at 753-55. 
31
 Id. at 756.  
32
 Id. at 756-60.  
33
 Id. at 756.  
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transaction it seeks to tax.”34  The Court then proceeded to list three separate instances in which 
it had upheld the power of states to impose collection and remittance liability on out-of-state 
sellers: where the sales were arranged by local agents in the taxing state, where the mail order 
seller maintained local retail stores, and where the out-of-state seller had independent contractor 
salespersons conducting continuous local solicitation in the taxing state.
35
   
However, the Court emphasized that it “ha[d] never held that a State may impose the duty 
of use tax collection and payment upon a seller whose only connection with customers in the 
State is by common carrier or the United States mail,”36 and had in fact ruled that a state could 
not constitutionally impose a use tax obligation upon an out-of-state seller whose only contacts 
with the taxing state were in-state advertisements and merchandise deliveries.
37
  The Court 
refused to obliterate the distinction between out-of-state sellers with property, retail outlets, or 
solicitors within a state and remote vendors who lack a physical presence within the taxing state 
and communicate with customers only through mail or common carrier.
38
  The Court feared that 
the many political subdivisions authorized to impose use tax and “[t]he many variations in rates 
of tax, in allowable exemptions, and in administrative and record-keeping requirements” would 
“entangle [] interstate business[es] in a virtual welter of complicated obligations to local 
jurisdictions with no legitimate claim to impose „a fair share of the cost of the local 
government.‟”39  As such, the imposition of use tax collection and remittance obligations on out-
                                                        
34
 Id. (quoting Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 344-45 (1954)).  
35
 Id. at 757-58. 
36
 Id. at 758 (emphasis added).  
37
 Id. (citing Miller Bros., 347 U.S. 340).  
38
 Id.  
39
 Id. at 759-60.  
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of-state retailers without a physical presence in the state was an unconstitutional burden on 
interstate commerce and violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
40
  
2. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady  
The issue in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, decided ten years after Bellas Hess, 
was whether a Mississippi tax on “„the privilege of … doing business‟ within the State,” as 
applied to the taxpayer‟s interstate commerce activities, unconstitutionally burdened interstate 
commerce.
41
  The taxpayer in Complete Auto was a Michigan corporation that transported 
General Motors Corporation vehicles by truck from a Mississippi railway station to Mississippi 
dealerships.
42
  The taxpayer claimed that because “its transportation was but one part of an 
interstate movement,” the “taxes assessed and paid were unconstitutional as applied to operations 
in interstate commerce.”43  However, the Mississippi Supreme Court sustained the tax, relying on 
the taxpayer‟s large business operation in Mississippi that was “dependent on the State for police 
protection and other State services the same as other citizens.”44  The state court believed that the 
taxpayer should have to “pay its fair share of taxes so long, but only so long, as the tax does not 
discriminate against interstate commerce and there is no danger of interstate commerce being 
smothered by cumulative taxes of several states.”45  
On appeal, the taxpayer relied solely on the “Spector rule,” which prohibited states from 
applying a state business privilege tax to an activity that was part of interstate commerce.
46
  
Conversely, Mississippi cited language from earlier Supreme Court cases that looked to the 
                                                        
40
 Id. at 760.  
41
Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 274 (1977). 
42
 Id. at 276. 
43
 Id. at 277. 
44
 Id. (quoting Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 330 So.2d 268, 272 (Miss. 1976)).  
45
 Id. (quoting Brady, 330 So.2d at 272). 
46
 Id. at 278 (citing Spector Motor Serv. v. O‟Connor, 340 U.S. 602 (1951)).  
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practical effect of a tax statute rather than just its formal language and had held that “[i]t was not 
the purpose of the commerce clause to relieve those engaged in interstate commerce from their 
just share of state tax burden even though it increases the cost of doing the business.”47 
Finding the Spector rule merely “a trap for the unwary draftsman,”48 the Court in 
Complete Auto chose to expressly overrule the Spector rule.
49
  Noting that it had previously 
rebutted the proposition that interstate commerce is immune from state taxation, the majority 
further rejected the formalism of the Spector rule and chose to adopt a rule with practical 
significance and economic consequence.
50
   The Court then held that states can constitutionally 
impose taxes on interstate commerce, so long as the tax (1) is applied to an interstate activity 
with a substantial nexus with the taxing state (2) is fairly apportioned, (3) does not discriminate 
against interstate commerce, and (4) is fairly related to the services provided by the state.
51
  
B. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota 
1. Facts 
The facts of Quill Corp. v. North Dakota are similar to those that gave rise to Bellas Hess 
over twenty years before.
52
  Both cases involved state attempts to require an out-of-state mail-
order business to collect and remit use tax on goods purchased by state residents for use within 
the state.
53
  In both cases, the taxpayers solicited business in the taxing state through catalogues 
and flyers but did not have any tangible property or personnel in the taxing state.
54
  Additionally, 
                                                        
47
 Id. at 279 (quoting W. Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250, 254 (1938)). 
48
 Id.  
49
 Id. at 288-89. 
50
 Id.  
51
 Id. at 279, 287.  
52
 Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 301 (1992).  
53
 Id. 
54
 See Quill, 504 U.S. at 302; Nat‟l Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep‟t of Revenue of Ill., 386 U.S. 753, 
754-55 (1967).  
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in both Bellas Hess and Quill, the state statute required retailers “maintaining a place of business 
in” the state to collect and remit the state‟s use tax and defined “retailer” to include mail-order 
companies without a physical presence if they solicited business within the state through 
catalogues and flyers.
55
  More specifically, in Quill, the North Dakota statute‟s definition of 
“retailer” included “every person who engages in regular or systematic solicitation of a consumer 
market in th[e] state,” meaning anyone who advertised in North Dakota three or more times 
within a 12-month period.
56
   
On these facts, the trial court ruled for Quill, the taxpayer, because it found no “nexus to 
allow the state to define retailer in the manner it chose,” making this case virtually 
indistinguishable from Bellas Hess.
57
  However, the North Dakota Supreme Court reversed, 
holding Bellas Hess constituted an “obsolescent precedent,” and that blindly following it would 
result in “ignor[ing] the tremendous social, economic, commercial, and legal innovations [that 
have occurred] since 1967.”58  Factually, the North Dakota Supreme Court highlighted the 
incredible growth of the mail order industry, from “a relatively inconsequential market niche into 
a goliath” worth $183.3 billion, or 15% of total national retail sales, and the transformative 
impact of modern technology on the method of operating a mail-order direct marketing 
business.
59
  Moreover, the North Dakota court also emphasized changes that had occurred in the 
“legal landscape” following the Court‟s decision in Bellas Hess.60  The court noted that under the 
four-pronged test set out in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, as applied in subsequent cases, 
the Commerce Clause no longer required the physical-presence nexus standard established in 
                                                        
55
 Quill, 504 U.S. at 302-03; Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 755.  
56
 Quill, 504 U.S. at 302-03.  
57
 Id. at 303.  
58
 North Dakota v. Quill Corp., 470 N.W.2d 203, 208 (N.D. 1991).  
59
 Id. at 208-09.  
60
 Id. at 209.  
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Bellas Hess, but looked more broadly at “the relationship between the out-of-state seller‟s 
contacts with the state and its establishment and maintenance of sales within the state.”61  
Additionally, under the Supreme Court‟s more recent Due Process cases, the “minimum 
contacts” and “fair warning” requirements of the Due Process Clause were found satisfied in 
personal jurisdiction cases when an out-of-state defendant “„purposefully directed‟ his activities 
at residents of the forum” state.62  Because Quill “„purposefully directed‟ its activities at North 
Dakota residents,” North Dakota “could, consistent with Due Process” require Quill to collect 
and remit use tax.
63
   The Supreme Court disagreed, and reversed the decision of the North 
Dakota Supreme Court.
64
  
2. Opinion 
Despite its claim in Bellas Hess that the tests for the Commerce Clause and the Due 
Process Clause were “closely related” and “similar,” the Court began its analysis in Quill by 
stating that “[t]he two constitutional requirements differ fundamentally in several ways,” as they 
“reflect different constitutional concerns” and are therefore “analytically distinct.”65  Therefore, 
it explained, “while a State may, consistent with the Due Process Clause, have the authority to 
tax a particular taxpayer, imposition of the tax may nonetheless violate the Commerce Clause.”66  
The Court then proceeded to overrule Bellas Hess‟s due process holding but affirm the bright-
line physical-presence nexus requirement of Bellas Hess on Commerce Clause grounds.
67
  
a) Due Process Analysis 
                                                        
61
 Id. at 210-12.  
62
 Id. at 212. 
63
 Id.  
64
 Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 319 (1992).  
65
 Id. at 305.  
66
 Id. 
67
 Id. at 308, 317-18.  
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According to the Court, “[t]he Due Process Clause „requires some definite link, some 
minimum connection, between a state and the person, property, or transaction it seeks to tax.‟”68  
Similarly, for the purpose of judicial jurisdiction, due process requires that a potential 
defendant‟s minimum contacts be “such that the maintenance of the suit [against him] does not 
offend „traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.‟”69  Although the Court conceded 
that in Bellas Hess it had “suggested” that physical presence within the state was necessary in 
order to satisfy the minimum contacts test,
70
 it emphasized that the Bellas Hess decision 
preceded the subsequent, substantial evolution of its due process jurisprudence in the realm of 
judicial jurisdiction.
71
   
The most significant due process development that the Quill Court cited was the 
recognition, in Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz,
72
 that “jurisdiction … may not be avoided 
merely because the defendant did not physically enter the forum state.”73  In fact, the Court in 
Burger King found that “the notion that an absence of physical contacts can defeat jurisdiction” 
has been “consistently rejected.”74  Instead, a court has jurisdiction “[s]o long as a commercial 
actor‟s efforts are „purposefully directed‟ toward residents of [the forum] State.”75  In rejecting 
the physical presence requirement for jurisdictional due process purposes, the Burger King 
opinion specifically noted: “it is an inescapable fact of modern commercial life that a substantial 
                                                        
68
 Id. at 306 (quoting Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 344-45 (1954)).  
69
 Id. at 307 (quoting Int‟l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)).  
70
 Id. at 306-07.  
71
 Id. at 307.  
72
 471 U.S. 462 (1985). 
73
 Quill , 504 U.S. at 307-08 (quoting Burger King, 471 U.S. at 476). 
74
 Id. at 308 (quoting Burger King, 471 U.S. at 476).  
75
 Id. (quoting Burger King, 471 U.S. at 476) (emphasis added).  
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amount of business is transacted solely by mail and wire communication across state lines, thus 
obviating the need for physical presence within a State in which business is conducted.”76   
The Court in Quill found this logic also justified “the imposition of the collection duty on 
a mail-order house that is engaged in continuous and widespread solicitation of business within a 
State” and affirmatively held that “[t]he requirements of due process are met irrespective of a 
corporation‟s lack of physical presence in the taxing State,” thus overruling Bellas Hess‟s due 
process holding.
77
  Because Quill “purposefully directed” its business activities at North Dakota 
and the extent of its contacts with North Dakota residents satisfied the minimum contacts due 
process standard, the Due Process Clause did not prevent the imposition and enforcement of use 
tax obligations against Quill.
78
 
b) Commerce Clause Analysis 
The Court began its analysis of Quill‟s Commerce Clause challenge by explaining that 
the Commerce Clause, in addition to expressly providing Congress with regulatory authority 
over interstate commerce, also implicitly prohibits states from taking certain actions that interfere 
with or burden interstate commerce.
79
  This is known as the “negative” or “dormant” Commerce 
Clause.
80
  The rule from early dormant Commerce Clause cases was simple: “no State has the 
right to lay a tax on interstate commerce in any form.”81  Later cases narrowed this rule and 
found some burdens on interstate commerce constitutional, but vacillated on the appropriate 
standard.
82
  In 1977, in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, the Supreme Court ultimately 
                                                        
76
 Id. (quoting Burger King, 471 U.S. at 746).  
77
 Id. (emphasis added).  
78
 Id. 
79
 Id. at 309.  
80
 Id.  
81
 Id. (quoting Leloup v. Port of Mobile, 127 U.S. 640, 648 (1888)).  
82
 Id. at 309-10.   
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rejected its earlier formalistic approaches and instead adopted a four-part test that examines the 
“practical effect” of a state tax statute.83  
The four-part test established in Complete Auto requires the Court to “sustain a tax 
against a Commerce Clause challenge so long as the „tax [1] is applied to an activity with a 
substantial nexus with the taxing State, [2] is fairly apportioned, [3] does not discriminate against 
interstate commerce, and [4] is fairly related to the services provided by the State.”84  The Court 
rejected the North Dakota Supreme Court‟s finding that Complete Auto‟s four-part test “rendered 
Bellas Hess „obsolete‟” for two reasons.85  First, although Bellas Hess was decided in 1967, “in 
the middle of [the] latest rally between formalism and pragmatism,” the Court found that Bellas 
Hess was distinguishable from its earlier formalistic cases because the holding of Bellas Hess did 
not rely on the mere “draftsmanship” or “labeling” of state taxes.86  Additionally, the Court 
found that Bellas Hess and Complete Auto can be read in harmony: Bellas Hess merely defines 
the “substantial nexus” required under Complete Auto‟s first prong.87  The Court found support 
for this proposition in National Geographic Society v. California Bd. of Equalization,
88
 decided 
just three weeks after Complete Auto.
89
  The Court claimed that National Geographic “affirmed 
the continuing vitality of Bellas Hess” and its “sharp distinction … between mail-order sellers 
[with a physical presence in the taxing] State and those … who do no more than communicate 
with customers in the State by mail or common carrier as part of a general interstate business.”90   
                                                        
83
 Id. at 310.  
84
 Id. at 311 (quoting Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977)). 
85
 Id. at 310-12.  
86
 Id. at 310-11.  
87
 Id. at 311.  
88
 430 U.S. 551 (1977). 
89
 Quill , 504 U.S. at 311 (citing Nat‟l Geographic Soc‟y v. Cal. Bd. of Equalization, 430 U.S. 
551 (1977)). 
90
 Id. (citing Nat‟l Geographic, 430 U.S. at 559).  
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The Court in Quill also rejected the North Dakota Supreme Court‟s assertion that “the 
nexus requirements imposed by the Due Process and Commerce Clauses are equivalent,” finding 
that unique constitutional concerns and policies underlie and support the two different 
standards.
91
  For example, the due process nexus analysis requires “notice” or “fair warning,” 
because the Due Process Clause ensures that governmental activity is “fundamental[ly] fair[]” 
and “legitimate.”92  In contrast, the nexus requirement of the Commerce Clause serves to protect 
the national economy from the any negative structural effects stemming from state regulation of 
interstate commerce.
93
  Accordingly, the first and fourth prongs of the Complete Auto test serve 
as an important check on state power to impose taxes that unduly burden interstate commerce by 
requiring a substantial nexus and relationship between the tax and state-provided services.
94
  
Therefore, “contrary to the State‟s suggestion, a corporation may have the „minimum contacts‟ 
with a taxing State as required by the Due Process Clause, and yet lack the „substantial nexus‟ 
with the State as required by the Commerce Clause.”95 
Finally, the Court explained why the bright-line physical-presence test of Bellas Hess is 
still good law, despite the Court‟s recent trend away from formalistic tests and toward “a more 
flexible substantive approach.”96  The Court concluded that modern Commerce Clause 
jurisprudence “favor[ing] more flexible balancing analyses” does not automatically overrule all 
established “bright-line” tests, particularly those that effectively prevent states from unduly 
burdening interstate commerce.
97
  Unlike earlier formalistic bright-line rules that distinguished 
                                                        
91
 Id. at 312.  
92
 Id. 
93
 Id. 
94
 Id. at 313.  
95
 Id.  
96
 Id. at 314.  
97
 Id. 
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merely between the statutory draftsman‟s choice of language, the Court concluded that the 
physical-presence rule of Bellas Hess actually furthers the ends of the Commerce Clause by 
creating a “safe harbor” for remote vendors.98  While the rule might “appear[] artificial at its 
edges,” that is not dispositive, as the rule‟s “artificiality… is more than offset by the benefits of a 
clear rule,” particularly in the realm of state taxation where various precedents often create a 
“quagmire.”99   
Because the Bellas Hess rule “ha[d] engendered substantial reliance,” the Court found 
there was “continuing value” in having a bright-line rule.100  Based on that continuing validity 
and principles of stare decisis, the Court held that the Commerce Clause ruling of Bellas Hess 
remains good law.
101
  Because the Court clarified that only the Commerce Clause, and not the 
Due Process Clause, requires a physical presence, the Court explicitly invited Congress to use its 
regulatory authority under the Commerce Clause and consider “whether, when, and to what 
extent the States may burden interstate mail-order concerns with a duty to collect use taxes.”102  
 3. Implications 
The holding of Quill is clear: the dormant Commerce Clause—but not the Due Process 
Clause—prohibits states from requiring out-of-state vendors without a substantial nexus with the 
taxing state to collect and remit the state‟s use tax.  Under Quill and Bellas Hess, the substantial 
nexus requirement is only met by satisfaction of the bright-line physical presence rule.   
Unfortunately, today, with the emergence of e-commerce, Quill applies to an incredible number 
of remote vendors, as its holding extends beyond its facts to any interstate vendor without a 
                                                        
98
 Id. at 314-15.  
99
 Id. at 315.  
100
 Id. at 317.  
101
 Id.  
102
 Id. at 318-19.  
    
17 
 
physical presence in the taxing state, not just mail-order businesses.  However, two aspects of 
Quill should give even its greatest critics hope: (1) its due process holding and (2) the Court‟s 
rationale for upholding the physical presence requirement of Bellas Hess. 
One of the most important aspects of the Quill opinion, often glossed over by its critics, is 
its due process holding.  In Quill, the Court expressly rejected the idea that the Due Process 
Clause prevents states from imposing use tax obligations on remote sellers, merely because those 
vendors lack physical presence within the taxing state.  By requiring only that the vendors satisfy 
the much lower “purposeful direction” standard, the Court practically eliminated any due process 
concerns from consideration.  Even more importantly, as acknowledged in its opinion, by 
“putting [the due process] problem to rest,” “Congress is now free to decide whether, when, and 
to what extent the States may burden interstate mail-order concerns with a duty to collect use 
taxes.”103  While Congress does not have the authority to permit states to infringe the due process 
rights of interstate actors, Congress can constitutionally regulate interstate commerce, which 
includes the power to expressly authorize the states to burden interstate commerce in certain 
ways.  The Quill decision, as opposed to Bellas Hess, is accordingly much less constitutionally 
restrictive and gives states the opportunity to either lobby Congress or seek to undermine the 
“burden” rationale of the Court‟s Commerce Clause analysis. 
The Court‟s two rationales for upholding the physical-presence requirement of Bellas 
Hess were “the continuing value of a bright-line rule” and stare decisis.  This means that states 
can undermine the Quill decision by attacking the weaknesses of either or both of these 
rationales.  The Court found that the benefits of the bright-line rule outweighed its artificiality.  
Those benefits centered on encouraging settled expectations and the fact that the rule had 
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engendered substantial reliance.  However, given the massive amounts of lost revenue stemming 
from Quill‟s prohibition, the incredible growth and strength of the e-commerce industry, and the 
burden and inequality confronting Main Street retailers, who must collect and remit the tax, the 
Court might find that the benefits of the bright-line rule might no longer outweigh its artificial 
edges, were the question to come before the Court again.  The Court‟s other rationale is also 
susceptible to attack.  Although stare decisis is an important principal, it only makes sense to 
uphold an earlier rule that is still relevant and controlling today.  While the Court in Quill 
rejected the North Dakota Supreme Court‟s argument that the technology and industry of 1992 
were sufficiently different from Bellas Hess to warrant overruling it, the time might be ripe today 
in the face of the e-commerce industry.  Regardless, states can also seek to avoid stare decisis in 
a more indirect way—by undermining the rationale provided in Bellas Hess, states also weaken 
Quill‟s reliance on Bellas Hess.   
III. Overturn Quill - The Federal Approach 
A senator first requested Congress accept the Supreme Court‟s invitation and provide a 
national solution to the states‟ remote vendor problem only two years after the Court‟s Quill 
decision.
104
  On February 3, 1994, Senator Dale Bumpers introduced Senate Bill 1825, known as 
the Tax Fairness for Main Street Business Act of 1994.
105
  The bill was read twice and referred 
to the Committee on Finance where it died.
106
  The bill never made it back to the Senate floor for 
a vote.
107
  Over the years, Congress has continuously failed to act on the issue despite the 
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introduction of relevant bills in the House or Senate almost annually.
108
  This has resulted in 
Congress upholding a destructive public policy that disadvantages local businesses, undermines 
state and local governments by reducing their tax revenues, and makes a regressive tax even 
more regressive, as those who can take advantage of the internet retailers‟ tax exemption are only 
those with internet access, a credit card, and a home or workplace that allows them to accept 
daytime deliveries.   
In 2011 alone, members of Congress have introduced four bills—Senate Bill 1832, House 
Bill 3179, Senate Bill 1452, House Bill 2701—that would remedy this flawed public policy and 
grant states the authority to require certain remote vendors, particularly e-retailers, to collect and 
remit sales or use tax to participating states.
109
  All four of these bills have been referred to 
committee,
110
 although it is doubtful whether any will make it past the committee and 
subcommittee stage, much less become law given the historical treatment of these types of 
proposals and the current anti-tax political climate.  All four bills require states seeking to collect 
tax from remote sellers to implement a simplified system for the administration of their sales and 
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use tax collection.
111
  Senate Bill 1452 and House Bill 2701 act by simply granting Congress‟s 
approval to a preexisting voluntary state agreement known as the Streamlined Sales and Use Tax 
Agreement, allowing the agreement to become binding.
112
  In contrast, House Bill 3179 contains 
its own simplification requirements for states wishing to impose a collection obligation on 
remote vendors and does not require states to become member states of the State Sales and Use 
Tax Agreement.
113
  S.B. 1832 is a hybrid of these two approaches: it grants authority for tax 
collection to Member States of the Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement while 
simultaneously providing an alternative simplification procedure that non-member states can 
choose to instead implement.
114
 
A. The Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement 
The Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement (the “SSUTA”) is the cooperative 
product of the Streamlined Sales Tax Project, a multistate effort organized by the National 
Governors Association and the National Council of State Legislatures to provide a simplified 
sales and use tax system that is neutral, efficient, certain and simple, effective and fair, and 
flexible.
115
  Forty-four states joined in the creation of the SSUTA, which operates as “a sort of 
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model tax code” that adopting states can “adapt to reflect their individual choices.”116  Twenty-
four states—including Oklahoma—have passed legislation conforming their state and use tax 
codes to the requirements of the SSUTA.
117
  The SSUTA improves tax administration in three 
major ways: (1) code simplification; (2) more efficient administration procedures; and (3) the use 
of emerging technologies, such as databases and administrative software.
118
   
Adoption of the SSUTA results in code simplification because the SSUTA requires  
“uniform tax definitions; uniform and simpler exemption administration; rate simplification; 
state-level administration of all sales taxes; uniform sourcing (where the sale is taxable); and 
state funding of the administrative cost.”119  Uniformity greatly benefits businesses operating in 
SSUTA member states by reducing administrative expenses and decreasing uncertainty.
120
  It 
allows businesses to look to only one source for exemption definitions, limits the number of tax 
rates businesses must learn and apply, and permits business to file only a single tax return with 
each state in which it operates, which prevents business from having to deal with a multitude of 
state and local governments and all their differing requirements.
121
  Administration is also made 
simpler through the use of technology.
122
  For example, each member state must provide a 
database with the tax rate for each of its local jurisdictions, matched up with the nine-digit zip 
codes in each local jurisdiction to ensure that businesses are clear on what rates apply in each 
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area.
123
  Furthermore, SSUTA states partner with the one of six certified companies in the private 
sector to supply sales tax administration software that makes it simple to calculate the tax owed 
on each purchase in each jurisdiction.
124
  The SSUTA states bear the cost of this service for any 
business without a physical presence in the state, in addition to compensating businesses for 
other reasonable expenses incurred in the collection of sales tax.
125
  
The SSUTA is a voluntary agreement, both in the sense that states voluntarily choose to 
become full members by adopting compliance legislation and also that remote vendors with 
customers in member states volunteer to collect and remit tax.
126
  Member states can provide 
vendors with incentives to collect the tax—both by diminishing the accompanying burden and by 
offering more direct advantages like amnesty on previously unremitted taxes—but they cannot 
force sellers to comply.
127
  However, three of the bills pending before Congress would change 
that by ratifying the SSUTA, 
128
 which would transform the SSUTA into “an interstate compact 
with the force of federal law,” enforceable against remote vendors.129 For example, Senate Bill 
1832 authorizes SSUTA member states “to require all sellers not qualifying for a small seller 
exception to collect and remit sales and use taxes with respect to remote sales sourced to that 
Member State pursuant to the provisions of the Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement.”130   
Ratifying the SSUTA is a common tactic in relevant federal bills because of its 
simplicity—congressional representatives advocating for this method do not have to reinvent the 
                                                        
123
 Id. 
124
 Id. 
125
 Id. 
126
 Hale & McNeal, supra note 115, at 263. 
127
 Id. at 264. 
128
 Marketplace Fairness Act, S. 1832, 112th Cong. § 3 (2011); Main Street Fairness Act, S. 
1452, 112th Cong. § 4 (2011); Main Street Fairness Act, H.R. 2701, 112th Cong. § 4 (2011). 
129
 Hale & McNeal, supra note 115, at 264. 
130
 Marketplace Fairness Act, S. 1832, 112th Cong. § 3 (2011) (emphasis added).  
    
23 
 
wheel, but merely advocate for the ratification of an agreement that has existed for over a 
decade.
131
  This approach has broad support.  For example, the Marketplace Fairness Act, which 
would ratify the SSUTA, had bipartisan support in its sponsorship when it was introduced last 
November.
132
  Additionally, the National Governors Association, the National Conference of 
State Legislatures, the Federation of Tax Administrators, the Multistate Tax Commission, and 
many large retailers support the SSUTA.
133
 The Streamlined Sales Governing Board promotes 
the SSUTA as an equalizer for remote vendors and local “brick-and-mortar” stores.  Others have 
endorsed the SSUTA as an alternative to the piecemeal, constitutionally questionable laws 
adopted by some states in response to frustration with the lack of another option.
134
  Opponents, 
however, include state and local governments who fear that the cost of compensating for 
administrative expenses will exceed the corresponding increase in revenue.
135
  Additionally, 
some have raised concerns about state sovereignty and self-determination of state tax policy, 
which the uniformity requirements of the SSUTA threaten.
136
 
B. The Non-SSUTA Bill: The Marketplace Equity Act of 2011 
Despite the popularity of the SSUTA ratification approach, one of the bills introduced 
this year approaches the problem of crafting a national solution slightly differently.  Like the 
other bills, the Marketplace Equity Act of 2011 authorizes electing states to require remote 
vendors to collect and remit sales and use taxes with respect to their sales to customers within 
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those states.
137
  However, to be an “electing state,” states do not have to become members of the 
SSUTA; instead, they can act “individually or through an agreement with one or more of the 
several States, to satisfy the [simplification] requirements of subsection (b).”138  This approach 
gives states a little more flexibility in deciding how exactly to proceed. 
Section 2, subsection (b) sets out the simplification requirements electing states must 
satisfy and provides an exception for “small sellers.”  Specifically, “remote sellers with gross 
annual receipts in the preceding calendar year from remote sales of items, services, and other 
products in the United States not exceeding $1,000,000 (or such greater amount as determined by 
the State involved) or in the State not exceeding $100,000 (or such greater amount as determined 
by the State)” are exempt from the collection and remittance obligation imposed on other remote 
vendors by subsection (a).
139
  The bill‟s simplification requirements include: (1) a single revenue 
authority to which remote sellers can submit a single tax return for all of its statewide liability; 
(2) a non-discriminatory, uniform tax base throughout the State; and (3) the use of one of three 
provided rate structures
140
 that produces a non-discriminatory rate, or a rate that is not higher 
than the respective rate for sellers other than remote sellers.
141
   
The simplification system of House Bill 3179 and the SSUTA share many characteristics.  
The most notable difference is merely that House Bill 3179 does not require states to join the 
interstate agreement to take advantage of the ability to require remote vendors to collect and 
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remit tax.  Whether through ratification of the SSUTA or adoption of a bill like House Bill 3179, 
there is significant reason for Congress to take action on this issue: the substantial loss of 
revenue confronting states, the necessity of avoiding piecemeal legislation, and the guarantee of 
constitutionality.  However, given the number of bills already proposed and the current anti-tax 
climate, it is unlikely that any of the bills currently in committee will have a much greater chance 
of success than their predecessors.  However, given that the “federal solution” remains the best 
one, and the recent support from companies like Amazon in response to state legislation,
142
 
Congress should seriously consider moving forward on the issue of state sales taxation and e-
commerce. 
IV. Current State Efforts to Challenge Quill 
After waiting in vain for a federal solution, several states have taken steps on their own to 
challenge Quill and resolve the problem of Internet tax avoidance.  Most states have sought to 
either attribute sufficient nexus to the remote vendors
143
 or require the out-of-state seller to 
provide information to the consumer and the state regarding use tax liability for non-taxed 
purchases.
144
  The effectiveness and probable constitutionality of the different laws vary.  
A. Attributed Nexus 
Quill and Bellas Hess require a vendor to have substantial nexus—meaning physical 
presence—with a taxing state before that state can require the vendor to collect and remit use 
tax.
145
  However, an understanding of two other Supreme Court decisions are necessary to 
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complete the nexus framework: Scripto, Inc. v. Carson,
146
 and Tyler Pipe Industries, Inc. v. 
Washington State Department of Revenue.
147
  In both cases, the Court attributed nexus to the out-
of-state seller based on actions of affiliated, soliciting third parties.   
In Scripto, the Supreme Court rejected a dormant Commerce Clause argument and 
upheld the imposition of Florida use tax collection duties on Scripto, a Georgia corporation, even 
though the company did not have (1) an “office, distributing house, warehouse, or other place of 
business in Florida, or (2) have any regular employee or agent there.”148  The nexus between 
Scripto and Florida consisted of ten “advertising specialty brokers,” or “wholesalers or jobbers,” 
each of whom was a Florida resident “actively engaged in Florida as a representative „of Scripto 
for the purpose of attracting, soliciting and obtaining Florida customers‟ for [Scripto‟s 
business].”149  The Court found it irrelevant for nexus purposes that the “jobbers” were not 
regular employees of Scripto since they were “conducting continuous local solicitation” on 
Scripto‟s behalf.150  Twenty-seven years later, relying on Scripto, the Court in Tyler Pipe 
Industries similarly held that a company could not defeat a showing of sufficient nexus by 
delineating its sales representatives “independent contractors” instead of “agents.”151  The Court 
concluded instead that the “crucial factor governing nexus is whether the activities performed in 
[the] state on behalf of the taxpayer are significantly associated with the taxpayer‟s ability to 
establish and maintain a market in [the] state for the sales.”152   
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Based on Scripto and Tyler Pipe Industries, states have passed laws attempting to 
attribute nexus to an out-of-state or pure Internet seller, based on the presence and activities of 
affiliates located in the taxing state.  States have attempted to attribute nexus to previously 
unreachable vendors either by using the vendor‟s in-state web affiliates (the “New York” 
approach) or in-state organizations in a commonly owned group with the vendor (the 
“California” approach).  
1. Website Affiliates - The New York Approach  
Some large Internet retailers like Amazon.com and Overstock.com have developed 
programs to allow independent third parties, known as “associates” or “affiliates,” to advertise 
the retailer‟s website on the associates‟ own websites and to receive a commission for related 
purchases, pursuant to an agreement or contract between the retailer and associate.
153
  Visitors to 
the third-party associates‟ websites can click on the link or banner advertising the Internet 
retailer, which will redirect the visitor to the retailer‟s own website.154  If the visitor then makes a 
purchase from the retailer, the retailer pays the associate a commission.
155
   
In 2008, New York sought to capitalize on these associate programs by using them to 
attribute nexus to previously unreachable pure Internet retailers.  New York‟s tax code already 
required “every vendor of tangible personal property” to collect sales and use tax.”156  The term 
“vendor” included … [a] person who solicits business … by employees, independent contractors, 
agents, or other representatives… and by reason thereof makes sales to persons within the state 
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of tangible personal property or services, the use of which is taxed.”157  On April 23, 2008, New 
York amended its tax statutes “to reflect the reality that many sales of goods to New York 
residents are effected [sic] through the Internet.”158  The amendment created a rebuttable 
presumption that retailers using an associate program were “soliciting business [in New York] 
through an independent contractor or other representative,”159 which under Scripto and Tyler 
Pipe Industries would constitute sufficient nexus, as the independent contractor‟s physical 
presence would be attributed to the retailer on whose behalf it solicited.  More specifically, the 
amendment stated:  
[A] person making sales of tangible personal property or services taxable under 
this article (“seller”) shall be presumed to be soliciting business through an 
independent contractor or other representative if the seller enters into an 
agreement with a resident of [New York] under which the resident, for a 
commission or other consideration, directly or indirectly refers potential 
customers, whether by a link on an internet website or otherwise, to the seller, if 
the cumulative gross receipts from sales by the seller to customers in [New York] 
who are referred to the seller by all residents with this type of an agreement with 
the seller is in excess of ten thousand dollars during the preceding four quarterly 
periods … This presumption may be rebutted by proof that the resident with 
whom the seller has an agreement did not engage in any solicitation in the state on 
behalf of the seller that would satisfy the nexus requirement of the United States 
constitution during the four quarterly periods in question.
160
 
 
The amended New York statute thus has two key components: the solicitation 
presumption and the requirements for rebuttal.
161
  The first component, the presumption, has a 
triggering mechanism.  To incur use tax collection responsibility under section 1101(b)(8)(vi), 
the out-of-state Internet seller must first enter into an agreement with a resident of New York.
162
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That agreement must be a commission-based referral agreement, rather than a flat-fee advertising 
contract.
163
  Aggregated together, all such agreements entered into between the Internet seller 
and New York residents must have generated more than $10,000 of gross receipts during past 
four quarterly periods from sales to customers located in New York, that were referred to the 
seller by the New York associate.
164
  If all of these requirements are met, the presumption will 
activate, and the Internet retailer will be obligated to collect and remit use taxes based on its use 
of in-state residents to solicit business from other New York residents, unless the seller can 
satisfy the rebuttal standard.
165
 
Sellers can rebut the presumption of in-state solicitation by providing proof that during 
the four quarterly periods in question, the seller‟s New York associates “did not engage in any 
solicitation in [New York] on behalf of the seller that would satisfy the nexus requirement of the 
United States constitution.”166  Because the statute itself did not provide guidance to sellers on 
how to prove the lack of solicitation, a negative, the Department of Taxation and Finance issued 
a second memorandum on June 30, 2008,
167
 which instituted a two-part “safe harbor” procedure 
for sellers.
168
  First, to rebut the presumption, sellers must include a “no solicitation” clause in 
their agreements with each New York associate.
169
  If each resident associate‟s contract stated 
that the representative was prohibited from “engaging in any solicitation activities in New York 
State that refer potential customers to the seller,” the seller would have satisfied the first portion 
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of the “safe harbor” procedure.170  Second, to ensure rebuttal, the sellers would also have to 
require each in-state associate to submit a signed certification each year, stating that the associate 
had not engaged in any such prohibited solicitation during the preceding year.
171
  If the seller 
satisfied both parts of the “safe harbor” procedure, the seller would be considered to have 
effectively rebutted the presumption of in-state solicitation, and thereby would remain free of 
any use tax obligations.
172
    
Two days after the Governor signed New York‟s “Amazon Law,” amending section 
1101(b)(8) of the tax statutes, plaintiff Amazon.com, LLC
173
 filed suit, alleging violations of the 
Commerce Clause and Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution, in addition to 
several other claims.
174
  The trial court granted the State‟s motion to dismiss on January 13, 
2009.
175
  In rejecting Amazon‟s facial Commerce Clause challenge, the court focused on the 
careful crafting of the law: that the law targeted out-of-state sellers using in-state contractors, 
ensured there was sufficient nexus, and provided an “out” for sellers by allowing them to rebut 
the statutory presumption of vendor qualification.
176
  Because Amazon did not rebut the statutory 
presumption by alleging “its New York Associates do not solicit business for it from New York 
customers,” the court also dismissed Amazon‟s as-applied Commerce Clause challenge.177  The 
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court found Amazon‟s Due Process Clause challenge to the presumption equally unconvincing, 
reasoning that “[t]here is a „reasonably high degree of probability‟ that New York business 
people and entities desirous of raising money that are compensated for referring customers who 
ultimately make purchases will solicit business from those with whom they are familiar and 
encourage sales.
178
  Amazon appealed.
179
 
On appeal, the reviewing court whether New York‟s law violated the Commerce and Due 
Process Clauses facially and as-applied to Amazon and Overstock, another online retailer that 
had filed suit.
180
  The court began by analyzing the parties‟ facial challenges in light of the high 
standard facing plaintiffs challenging the constitutionality of a statute.
181
  After finding that the 
parties‟ Commerce Clause challenges implicated only the first prong of the Brady test182—the 
substantial nexus requirement—the court relied on Matter of Orvis Co. v. Tax Appeals Tribunal 
of the State of New York,
183
 for the proposition that “while a physical presence of the vendor is 
required, it need not be substantial.”184  Thus, “the conduct of economic activities in the taxing 
State performed by the vendor‟s personnel or on its behalf” may manifest the necessary physical 
presence.
185
  Based on this approval of attributed nexus, the court concluded “that on its face, the 
statute does not violate the Commerce Clause” because “it imposes a tax collection obligation on 
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an out-of-state vendor only where the vendor enters into a business-referral agreement with a 
New York State resident, and only where that resident receives a commission based on a sale in 
New York.”186  In upholding the law, the court specifically looked to three factors: (1) the 
requirement that the in-state presence must involve solicitation, not mere advertising; (2) that the 
law provided a “ready escape hatch” through the “safe harbor” rebuttal procedure; and (3) that 
New York had a “legitimate basis” for concluding that in-state representatives are likely to solicit 
business when paid on a sales commission basis.  Because the court could recite “a set of 
circumstances under which the law would be valid”—when a seller‟s New York representative 
with sufficient in-state presence receives a commission for proactively soliciting sales—the 
facial Commerce Clause challenge failed.
187
 
Both of the parties‟ facial Due Process Clause challenges—the “irrational and 
irrebuttable presumption” and “void for vagueness” arguments—also failed.188  Citing Quill, the 
Appellate Division court distinguished the Commerce Clause and Due Process Clause nexus 
requirements and applied the less burdensome “minimum contacts” due process test.189  The 
court then considered the claims of “irrebuttable presumption” and “vagueness” more 
specifically.
190
   
Amazon and Overstock first argued that section 1101(b)(8)(vi) was unconstitutional 
because it contained an “irrational and irrebuttable” presumption.  Section 1101(b)(8)(vi) of the 
New York Tax Law presumes that an in-state representative paid on commission is incentivized 
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to proactively solicit sales in order to generate greater pay.
191
  After conceding that the Supreme 
Court disfavors irrebuttable presumptions “as violative of due process,” the court recognized 
that many rebuttable presumptions are frequently upheld, so long as there is “a rational 
connection between the basic facts proven and the ultimate fact presumed.”192  New York‟s Due 
Process Clause requires a presumption to satisfy the standard of a “reasonably high degree of 
probability that the presumed fact follows from those proved directly.”193  However, even under 
the higher standard, the court found the statutory presumption constitutional because “it is not 
irrational to presume that the [seller‟s] in-state representative will engage in various legal 
methods to enhance earnings,” including solicitation.194  Any representatives behaving in a 
contrary fashion can prove that they did not engage in solicitation, thus helping the seller avoid 
use tax collection obligations.
195
  The parties also made a “void for vagueness” due process 
argument based on the words “or indirectly,” “or other consideration,” and “solicitation,” which 
the court quickly dispensed with, noting that it found the parties‟ criticisms “perplexing” as the 
phrases presented no cause for confusion.
196
 
Amazon and Overstock fared better on their as-applied challenges, as the Appellate 
Division found that the lack of discovery and undeveloped record precluded them from making a 
determination on both the Commerce Clause and Due Process Clause “presumption” claims.197  
For purposes of the Commerce Clause challenge, the court remanded for discovery, holding that 
it was unable “to conclude as a matter of law” that plaintiff‟s in-state representatives were 
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actually “engaged in sufficiently meaningful activity”—solicitation, rather than merely 
advertising—and that those activities were “„significantly associated‟ with the out-of-state 
retailer‟s ability to do business in the state,” as required by Tyler Pipe Industries.198  Similarly, 
for due process purposes, the court remanded to allow Amazon and Overstock to challenge the 
validity of the statutory presumption by evidencing that “all their in-state representatives do is 
advertise on New York-based Web sites.”199   
No other court has yet reviewed the constitutionality of section 1101(b)(8)(vi); therefore, 
New York‟s law remains in-force for the time being.  It is unclear if the Supreme Court will 
grant certiorari and review the New York courts‟ Commerce Clause and Due Process holdings.  
However, the Court‟s language in Quill inviting Congress to act is reason to believe that the 
Supreme Court might deny any petition for certiorari or at least delay in taking the case.
200
  Until 
a higher court sanctions this type of “Amazon law,” it might be wise for states to be wary of 
passing similar legislation.  Although several other states have already passed or considered 
legislation styled on New York‟s law,201 such a move can be risky and expensive.  For example, 
the Tax Foundation warns that “Amazon Laws” can result in more costs than benefits because 
such laws often fail to generate revenue and actually result in losses as online retailers simply 
end their affiliate programs in those states, mire the state in expensive litigation, can be seen 
placing disproportionate collection burdens on Internet sellers, and create uncertainty and 
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increase compliance costs for businesses.
202
  Based on the potential risks and the uncertainty 
surrounding a New-York-style Amazon Law, states should first consider other approaches before 
adopting similar legislation. 
2. Common Ownership Nexus - The California Approach  
When California enacted its “Amazon Law” in 2011,203 it had the benefit of other states‟ 
experiences and was able to borrow ideas and incorporate them into its statute.  In one section of 
its two-part statute, California adopted a modified form of the “New York” approach and 
amended its definition of “retailer engaged in business in this state” for the purpose of sales and 
use tax collection duties.
204
  The new definition includes out-of-state retailers entering into 
commission-based agreements with California residents who refer potential customers with a 
link on their websites, so long as the remote vendor had $10,000 in cumulative referred sales of 
tangible property to California purchasers and $1,000,000 in total cumulative sales of tangible 
personal property to customers in California in the preceding year.
205
  California expressly 
provided that section 6203(c)(5) is inapplicable to advertising-only agreements and requires 
solicitation to become operative; thus, it does not apply to those retailers who can demonstrate 
that their in-state affiliate did not engage in referrals in a manner that would satisfy the 
requirements of the Commerce Clause.
206
  California defined “retailer” for the purpose of section 
6203(c)(5) to include “an entity affiliated with a retailer within the meaning of Section 1504 of 
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the Internal Revenue Code,” meaning that it attacked the online affiliate programs of Internet 
retailers even more broadly than New York because it not only allowed in-state affiliates‟ 
solicitation activities to be attributed to the retailer they contract with, but also to any company 
affiliated with that retailer under Internal Revenue Code section 1504.
207
  
In the second portion of its “Amazon Law,” California chose to attack a different 
avoidance technique of Amazon‟s—entity isolation and the use of in-state subsidiaries.  Amazon 
has a history of “aggressive” tax planning,208 as evidenced by its decision to establish its 
headquarters in Seattle, rather than in Los Angeles.
209
  Jeff Bezos, the founder of Amazon, 
explained that because companies “have to charge sales tax to customers who live in any state 
where [the companies] have a business presence,” “[i]t made no sense for [Amazon] to be in 
California or New York,” given the high populations and high sales potential of those states.210  
However, although Amazon itself does not have a physical presence in California, it does have 
several subsidiaries in the state: A2X Development Centers, with locations in Cupertino (dba 
Lab126), Orange County, San Francisco, and San Luis Obispo (dba ZME); A9.com, in Palo 
Alto; and Alexa, located in San Francisco.
211
  California thus decided to attribute to Amazon the 
nexus of its subsidiaries, with those entities‟ operations in California thereby satisfying Quill‟s 
physical presence requirement.
212
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Similar to how it handles web-based affiliates, California‟s statute attributes the nexus of 
subsidiaries to a parent by expanding the definition of a “retailer engaged in business” in 
California.
213
  Under California Revenue and Tax Code section 6203(a), every “retailer engaged 
in business in [California] and making sales of tangible personal property for storage, use, or 
other consumption in [California], not exempted … shall, at the time of making the sales or … at 
the time the storage, use, or other consumption becomes taxable, collect the tax from the 
purchaser.”  Subsection (c) defines “[r]etailer engaged in business in [California]” as “any 
retailer that has substantial nexus with [California] for the purposes of the commerce clause of 
the United States Constitution and any retailer upon whom federal law permits this state to 
impose a use tax collection duty.”214  The Code then provides a non-exclusive list of examples of 
such retailers.
215
   
One type of retailer included in section 6203(c) is a retailer that is part of a commonly 
controlled group that represents a combined reporting group for purposes of California‟s 
corporate income tax if another member of that commonly controlled group, “pursuant to an 
agreement with the retailer, performs services in [California] in connection with tangible 
personal property to be sold by the retailer, including, but not limited to, design and development 
of tangible personal property sold by the retailer, or the solicitation of sales of tangible personal 
property on behalf of the retailer.”216   Section 25105 defines a “commonly controlled group” in 
terms of majority ownership: if a parent owns “more than 50% of the voting power” of its 
subsidiary, or if “the same person” owns or constructively owns “stock representing 50% of the 
voting power” of brother/sister corporations, then the corporations will be considered part of a 
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commonly controlled group.
217
  Section 6203(c)(4) does not require an agency relationship 
between the commonly owned companies to trigger its application.
218
    
The California legislature seemingly designed this portion of 6203(c) to ensnare Amazon 
specifically, perhaps responding to Amazon‟s refusal to collect use taxes even in states, such as 
California, where it has a “substantial physical presence” in the form of its or its subsidiaries‟ 
headquarters, warehouses, customer service centers, or research and development facilities.
219
  
For example, Lab126, an Amazon subsidiary in Cupertino, California, developed and designed 
the Kindle,
220
 Amazon‟s e-reader. Amazon consistently refuses to disclose how many Kindles it 
has sold, instead issuing vague press releases about its Kindle sales, such as claiming that the 
Kindle‟s growth rate recently tripled,221 that its new Kindle is “the bestselling product in 
Amazon‟s history,”222 or that the Kindle 3 is “the fastest-selling ever.”223  In 2010 however, 
analysts estimated that Amazon had sold millions of Kindle devices and that Kindle sales 
accounted for 3-5% of Amazon‟s total revenue, meaning that Amazon could have generated $1.7 
billion in Kindle sales in 2010.
224
  Despite the phenomenal success of the Kindle, Amazon has 
refused to collect use tax from purchasers of its Kindle e-reader and books in California, the 
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birthplace of the Kindle.  The California law seeks to change this practice by attributing the 
physical presence of subsidiaries like Lab126 to their parent, Amazon, in order to subject 
Amazon to sales and use tax collection duties under Quill and Scripto.  
Given Amazon‟s immediate opposition to the new California law, the state legislature 
agreed to delay implementation of the law for one-year to give Congress a chance to write and 
pass federal legislation resolving the states‟ use tax collection conflicts with e-commerce.225  If 
Congress does not act within the next year and the new version of section 6203 becomes 
operative, Amazon is sure to file suit challenging the law‟s constitutionality, as it did in New 
York, or act to limit its liability under the new law. Such actions could effectively result in an 
immediate compromise of the law‟s intended goals.  For example, Amazon, along with fellow 
Internet retailer Overstock, has already responded by cutting ties with thousands of its California 
affiliates, saying it “had no plans to begin collecting California sales taxes.”226  The actions of 
online sellers in either terminating their affiliate programs or forbidding those associates from 
soliciting business in a manner that triggers section 6203 raises questions of futility because 
without a trigger, the retailer will not have a statutory obligation to collect use taxes, and the 
state will continue to lose revenue.
227
   
There are also doubts about the constitutionality of California‟s approach, apart from the 
questions of its potential effectiveness.  The constitutionality of the “common ownership” 
approach depends on whether the courts will allow states to ignore the separate and distinct legal 
status of the different entities in a commonly owned group.  The new version of section 
                                                        
225
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6203(c)(4) will allow California to treat Amazon as a retailer operating in California obligated to 
collect California sales and use taxes because of its wholly owned subsidiaries in California, like 
A9.com and Lab126.
228
  Amazon‟s situation differs from that of National Geographic because in 
that case National Geographic itself actually maintained a California office—albeit a different 
department than its mail order business—with National Geographic employees, meaning that 
National Geographic itself had a physical presence in California.
229
 Conversely, Amazon‟s 
subsidiaries are separately incorporated, legally distinct companies with their own employees, 
meaning that Amazon itself does not have a physical presence in California.
230
   
In Scripto and Tyler Pipe Industries, the Supreme Court allowed states to attribute the in-
state physical presence of an out-of-state seller‟s representatives to the out-of-state seller.231  
However, in both cases, the representatives the states used to attribute nexus acted as the 
retailers‟ agents.232  Section 6203(c)(4), in contrast, does not require an agency relationship 
between the subsidiary and principal before attributing the physical presence of one to the 
other.
233
  This might be a problem for California because Amazon‟s subsidiaries are “legally 
separate persons from Amazon,” who “have kept their corporate identities separate and intact” 
and who have their own operations, assets, and payrolls.
234
  Although A9.com and Lab126 
“produce products … that are integral to Amazon‟s business,” that alone does not rise to the 
level of agency found in Scripto or Tyler Pipe Industries and it is possible that the Supreme 
Court will make agency, rather than just common ownership, necessary to satisfy the dormant 
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Commerce Clause.
235
  Therefore, the constitutionality of California‟s “common ownership” 
approach remains in doubt, even now, before the effective date of the new law. 
B. The Information Approach - The Colorado Example 
Colorado has attacked its sales and use tax problem in a manner quite distinct from that 
of New York or California.  First, while New York‟s law presumes that an online seller is 
physically present in New York because of the presence of its in-state web-based affiliates, 
Colorado pioneered the “common ownership” approach later modified and adopted by 
California: the law presumes that an remote retailer is physically present and “doing business in 
[Colorado]” if it and another company with physical presence in Colorado are both members of 
the same commonly owned group.
236
  Second, while both New York and California focused on 
ways to force Internet retailers to collect and remit taxes, Colorado‟s law instead requires 
Internet retailers to collect and remit information.
237
     
Colorado imposes a 2.9% tax on the purchase price of all retail sales of tangible personal 
property made after January 1, 2001.
238
  The “retailer” or “vendor” selling the property is “liable 
and responsible for the payment” of the tax imposed.239  In Colorado, a “retailer” or “vendor” is 
“a person doing business in [Colorado], known to the trade and public as such, and selling to the 
user or consumer, and not for resale.”240  A retailer is a person “doing business in [Colorado]” 
when it sells, leases, or delivers tangible personal property in Colorado by retail sale.
241
  This 
definition of “doing business in [Colorado]” includes maintaining a place of business in 
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Colorado, whether directly or indirectly, and soliciting business in Colorado through any 
means.
242
  It also creates a rebuttable presumption
243
 that a retailer is doing business in Colorado 
if that retailer “does not collect Colorado sales tax” and is “part of a controlled group of 
corporations” that includes “a component member that is a retailer with physical presence in 
[Colorado].”244  This provision means that a remote vendor in a brother-sister or parent-
subsidiary relationship with an in-state retailer will be presumed to also be “doing business in 
[Colorado]” for the purposes of Colorado‟s sales and use tax statutes.245   
Retailers that do business in Colorado but do not collect Colorado sales tax are known as 
“non-collecting retailers.”246  In order to increase use tax compliance by individuals making 
remote purchases, Colorado imposes notice and reporting obligations on such non-collecting 
retailers.
247
  The non-collecting retailer‟s obligation is threefold: (1) time of sale notice to the 
purchaser; (2) annual notice to the purchaser; and (3) annual reporting to Colorado‟s department 
of revenue.
248
  
First, with each purchase, non-collecting retailers must notify all Colorado purchasers 
that the retailer does not collect Colorado sales tax, that the purchase is not exempt merely 
because it was made by remote means, and that the purchaser has a duty to file a sales or use tax 
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return with the state and pay use tax on their purchase from the retailer.
249
  Retailers are subject 
to a five-dollar penalty for each failure to provide the required notice.
250
  The amended Colorado 
statute also imposes annual information obligations on retailers not collecting Colorado sales 
tax.
251
  Non-collecting retailers must send each Colorado purchaser
252
 an annual statement by 
January 31 that states the total amount that the purchaser paid for all Colorado purchases made 
from the retailer in the previous calendar year.
253
  The statement must be sent by first class mail; 
be prominently labeled “Important tax document enclosed;” summarize purchase dates, 
descriptions, and dollar amounts; advise the purchaser that the law requires the retailer to provide 
the Colorado Department of Revenue with the purchaser‟s total dollar amount of purchases; and 
again notify the purchaser of his or her obligation to file a Colorado state or use tax return.
254
  
Failure to provide annual statements to Colorado purchasers results in a ten-dollar penalty for 
each notification failure.
255
  The retailer must also file a similar annual statement for each 
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purchaser with the Colorado department of revenue,
256
 subject to a ten-dollar penalty for each 
purchaser that should have been included in such annual statement but was omitted.
257
   
Colorado‟s information approach could serve as an interesting model for other states 
attempting to close the gap in their sales and use tax revenue created by e-commerce and other 
remote purchases.  However, there are two obstacles for other states seeking to adopt the 
Colorado approach: (1) uncertain constitutionality and (2) ineffectiveness.  Before this year, it 
seemed possible that Colorado‟s version of an “Amazon law” would be found constitutional: it 
relied on the physical presence of a component member in the same group of controlled 
corporations as the retailer—satisfying the dormant Commerce Clause—and created a 
presumption that is both rational and rebuttable—comporting with due process.258  However, on 
March 30, 2012, the United States District Court for the District of Colorado held the Colorado 
law unconstitutional and permanently enjoined its enforcement.
259
   
The Direct Marketing Ass‟n court found that Colorado‟s reporting requirements violated 
the dormant Commerce Clause both by discriminating against and placing an undue burden on 
out-of-state retailers.
260
  With respect to the discrimination claim, the court acknowledged that 
“[o]n their face the Act and Regulations do not distinguish between in-state retailers… and out-
of-state retailers.  Rather, the Act focuses on the distinction between retailers who collect 
                                                        
256
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Colorado sales tax and those who do not collect Colorado sales tax.”261  However, the court 
reasoned that because Colorado law already requires all in-state retailers to collect sales tax, 
functionally, the notice and reporting requirements only apply to out-of-state retailers.
262
  This 
results in “patent discrimination,” since the statute and its regulations “produce, in effect, a 
geographic distinction between in-state and out-of-state retailers” in violation of the Quill 
doctrine and the Commerce Clause.
263
  The court found this discrimination to exist despite “the 
veil provided by the words of the Act and the Regulations.”264  Colorado‟s legitimate state 
interests and purposes were not sufficient to overcome this discrimination, given that Colorado 
did not rebut the plaintiff‟s proffered reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives.265  Moreover, 
the court found that because “the sole purpose of the burdens imposed by the Act and 
Regulations is the ultimate collection of use taxes when sales taxes cannot be collected,” 
Colorado‟s law is unduly burdensome because “the burdens imposed by the Act and the 
Regulations are inextricably related in kind and purpose to the burdens condemned in Quill.”266  
Even assuming the Tenth Circuit reverses the District Court and holds Colorado‟s 
reporting requirements constitutional on appeal, there is still a problem with the law‟s 
effectiveness.  It is possible that the disclosure requirements could allow Colorado to audit and 
seek payment from individuals owing the tax far more effectively.  The law‟s effectiveness, 
however, depends on its reach.  Ironically, Amazon, for whom the law is named, would not fall 
within the law‟s scope because Amazon does not have the necessary direct or indirect 
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presence—neither Amazon nor any of its subsidiaries have a physical presence in Colorado.267  
One analyst goes so far as to refer to Colorado‟s “self-help” law as something of mere “symbolic 
value,” claiming it is “superfluous” to those conventional retailers who already collect state sales 
taxes because of their physical presence in the state and will have only a limited affect on many 
Internet retailers because its reach only extends to those remote vendors who have at least an 
indirect physical presence in Colorado through their subsidiaries or other commonly owned 
group members.
268
 Furthermore, just because a state would receive information about remote 
purchasers under this approach, “it is not clear how [this receipt] will transfer into revenue,” as 
“states may not have the resources to receive and properly analyze such an enormous quantity of 
reports.”269  Accordingly, there is an argument that Colorado‟s law, like New York‟s or 
California‟s, will never be effective and that only a uniform federal solution, rather than a 
piecemeal state-by-state approach, will resolve the e-commerce sales and use tax controversy.
270
  
V.  Reinterpret Quill 
Traditionally, those commenting on Quill are detractors who malign it as an outdated 
decision that severely constricts states and ravages their revenues and budgets in the Internet age.  
However, a different paradigm has recently emerged, one that actually views the Quill decision 
as providing “an ideal framework for determining when states should be allowed to subject 
remote e-commerce vendors to sales and use taxation.”271  The idea is that only the reporting or 
compliance costs stemming from the imposition of tax collection and remittance duties on the 
out-of-state vendor burden interstate commerce in derogation of the dormant Commerce Clause, 
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not imposition of the duties themselves.
272
  Therefore, adequate compensation from the states for 
the reporting and compliance costs incurred by remote vendors “would completely alleviate the 
burden on interstate commerce,” resulting in a “constitutionally permissible approach for 
partially subjecting remote vendors to use taxes.”273  This approach points out that Quill provides 
two justifications for its physical presence rule: the dormant Commerce Clause and stare 
decisis.
274
  Adequate compensation would remove both justifications from the analysis because it 
would eliminate the burden on interstate commerce; therefore, it would attack the underpinnings 
of Bellas Hess, the case the Quill court cited as precedent.
275
   
The dormant Commerce Clause does not require states to give remote vendors or e-
commerce sellers an advantaged position.
276
  Instead it only prevents states from disadvantaging 
such sellers in a way that burdens interstate commerce.  Consequently, remote vendors are not 
entitled to continue enabling consumer tax avoidance and taking advantage of the tax loophole 
created by Quill if there is a way to require them to collect the tax due the state without 
subjecting them to a burden of higher aggregate compliance costs than local sellers.
277
  The 
problem facing remote vendors, as noted by the Court in Bellas Hess and Quill, is that remote 
vendors face a “virtual welter of complicated obligations” because of their presence in multiple 
taxing jurisdictions.
278
  The Quill court found that remote vendors were at a significant 
disadvantage when compared with local sellers because a remote vendor could potentially be at 
the mercy of “6,000-plus taxing jurisdictions,” all with different rules and obligations, while a 
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local seller has the much simpler duty of complying with the single jurisdiction in which it is 
located.
279
   
The remedy, then, is for states to alleviate this burden before subjecting remote vendors 
to tax.  Instead of passing controversial legislation or lobbying for Congress to ratify the SSUTA, 
something that remains unlikely, states could simply interpret Quill as only restricting them from 
imposing use tax collection duties on remote vendors if those vendors are not adequately 
compensated by the state “for all such compliance costs imposed.”280  While compensated 
remote vendors would maintain a slight advantage over uncompensated local vendors, they 
would no longer be able to use tax avoidance to create a price advantage.
281
  Additionally, 
although states would have to fully compensate e-sellers and other remote vendors—at an 
estimated cost of about 1-3% of tax revenues raised—this result would still be a substantially 
greater income, or approximately 97% of the revenue from e-commerce taxes, where now they 
receive little, if any at all.
282
  The loss of revenue from compensation payouts would give states 
an added incentive to simplify their tax administrative systems on their own, in their own way, 
rather than in a fashion mandated by the SSUTA or Congress.
283
  The sellers could be 
compensated in a simple manner: allow remote vendors to “keep a specified percentage of the 
use tax amounts they collect” as compensation for their compliance costs or reimburse sellers for 
the “actual verifiable” amount they expend to comply.284  The best approach, and one that would 
be the easiest for states to administer, would be a combination method where vendors 
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automatically keep a set percentage of the tax collected but have the option of demonstrating 
“actual verifiable compliance costs” in excess of the amount kept to receive additional 
corresponding compensation.
285
   
This approach has value in that it avoids the litigation, controversy, and economic 
consequences of passing individual, piecemeal “Amazon” laws at the state level.  It also has the 
advantage of self-implementation, something important to states in the face of Congress‟s 
continuing disinterest and failure to act.  However, it does come with the risk that the Court will 
disagree with the states‟ “interpretation” of Quill and rule against states using this method, based 
on the principle of stare decisis, despite the argument that compensation distinguishes this 
approach from Quill or Bellas Hess.  At the very least, this interpretation of Quill contributes 
something novel to the debate over e-commerce and sales and use taxes and is certainly 
something states should consider, particularly those that do not already have some sort of 
compensation scheme to incentivize vendors to voluntarily assume collection and remittance 
obligations. 
VI.  Conclusion 
Quill Corporation v. North Dakota has produced almost two decades of controversy.  
Ideally, Congress would accept the Supreme Court‟s invitation and take action to provide a 
national solution to the sales and use tax crisis many states are confronting.  However, while 
Congress refuses to act, there are solutions for states interested in immediate action.  While it is 
inadvisable for more states to adopt “Amazon” laws until the New York and Colorado laws are 
fully upheld, states can join the SSUTA or create compensation programs to add incentivize 
voluntary compliance.  Over the next few years states can learn which approaches seem the most 
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likely to pass constitutional muster, and adopt them.  Finally, given the increasing amount of 
attention to this issue, perhaps much-needed change will come and finally bring state tax codes 
into the Internet age.   
 
 
